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IS THE TIME FOR REMOVAL OF AN
ACTION FROM STATE TO FEDERAL
COURT SUBJECT TO EXTENSION'
GEORGE J. LAIKIN
Both federal and state cases are in conflict as to whether the time
for removal of an action from a state court to a federal court is
subject to extension by stipulation of the parties, order of the court,
or special appearance of defendant. 2 The United States Supreme Court
has not yet decided this conflict.
Removal from a state court to the federal court is authorized by
Section 28, Title 29, of the Judicial Code.- Procedure is prescribed by
Section 294, and provides that, in proper cases, jurisdictional prerequi-
a Certain phases of Sections 28 and 29, Title 28, of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.
C.A. Sections 70 and 71, -will be considered, particularly with respect to Wis-
consin Law.
254 C.J. 304, 305, 307; 28 U.S.C.A. § 72, notes 56 and 57. Telis vs. Palatine
Ins. Co., 149 Fed. 560 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1906).
328 U.S.C.A. § 71, the relevant provisions being the following: "Any suit of a
civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under the constitution or laws of the
United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority,
of which the district courts of the United States are given original jurisdic-
tion in any state court, may be removed by the defendant or defendants therein
to the district court of the United States for the proper district. Any other
suit of a similar nature, at law or in equity, of which the district courts of
the United States are given jurisdiction in any state court, may be removed
into the district court of the United States for the proper district by the
defendant or defendants therein, being non-residents of the state .... When-
ever any cause shall be removed from any state court into any district court
of the United States, and the district court shall decide that the cause was
improperly removed and order the same remanded to the state court from
whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and
no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the district court so remand-
ing such cause shall be allowed...
28 U.S.C.A. § 72:
"Whenever any party entitled to remove any suit mentioned in Section 71 of
the title, except suits removable on the ground of prejudice or local influence,
may desire to remove such suit from a state court to the district court of
the United States, he may make and file a petition, duly verified, in such suit,
in such state court, at the time, or at any time before the defendant is required
by the laws of the state or the rile of the state court in which the suit is
brought, to answer or plead to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff,
for the removal of such suit into the district court to be held in the district
where such suit is pending, and shall make and file therewith a bond, with
good and sufficient surety, for his or her entering in such district court, within
thirty days from the date of filing said petition, a certified copy of the record
in such suit, and for paying all costs that may be awarded by said district
court, if said district court shall hold that such suit was wrongfully or improp-
erly removed thereto, . . . It shall then be the duty of the State Court to
accept said petition and bond and proceed no further in such suit. Written
notice of said petition and bond for removal shall be given to the adverse
party or parties prior to filing the same. The said copy being entered within
said thirty days as aforesaid, in said district court of the United States, the
parties so removing the said cause shall, within thirty days thereafter, plead,
answer, or demur to the declaration or complaint in said cause, and the
cause shall then proceed in the same manner as if it had been originally
commenced in said district court." (Author's italics.)
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sites obtaining, removal may be accomplished by filing a petition and
bond in the state court, "at the time, or at any time before the defend-
ant is required by the laws of the state, or the rule of the state court
in which the suit is brought to answer or plead to the declaration or the
complaint of the plainiff . .."
Unless a defendant files his petition and bond for removal within
the time he is required to answer, his right of removal is irrevocably
lost. Quaere: Does an order of a state court, or a stipulation of the
parties, extending the time to answer, likewise extend the time for
removal? The majority of cases hold in the negative. It is submitted,
however, that in Wisconsin, the Supreme Court not having passed on
the question,' the minority view ought to prevail; and this, notwith-
standing Velie v. Manufacturer's Accident Indemnity Company of the
U. S., decided in 1889 by what is now the District Court for the East-
ern District of Wisconsin.5
The decision in the Velie case10 is typical of the majority view.
The plaintiff commenced an action in the state court against the
defendant, a foreign corporation. Summons and complaint were served
on May 20th, 1889; the answer was due on June 9th. On June 3rd the
parties stipulated to extend the time for answer until July 9th. On July
6th the defendant filed his petition and bond for removal in the state
court. Were the proceedings for removal, not having been taken within
the original twenty days for answer, but within the extended period,
timely?
The court referred to what is now Section 263.05 of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes, which provides for the filing of an answer within twenty
days after service of the complaint, and held that this was the time
designated by the Removal Act for filing a petition and bond for
removal. Because: It was the intention of Congress, that if a case is
to be removed at all, it should be removed at the earliest possible period
in order that the issues might be properly presented and decided in the
federal court. The statutory specification of the number of days for
answer, provided an early and definite limitation upon the time for
removal. True, the time for answer might vary from state to state,
- The term "rule of court" has reference to the practice in those states where
no time is fixed by statute for answering but under the law, the court rule
prescribes the time. Spangler v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 42 Fed. 305 (C.C. Mo.
1890); Amsden v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., 44 Fed. 515 (C.C. Ind.
1890) ; Dills v. Champion Fiber Co., 175 N.C. 49, 94 S.E. 694 (1917).
6Commissioners of Road Improvement Dist. v. St. Louis, 257 U.S. 547, 42
Sup. Ct. 250, 66 L.ed. 364 (1921). While the statutory limits of time have
generally been rigidly adherred to by the courts, it has been held that the
requirements as to the time within which removal proceedings shall be taken
is not jurisdictional, but merely modal and formal. Montgomery v. Sioux City
Seed Co., 71 F. (2d) 926 (C.C.A. 10th, 1934) ; Halsey v. Minn. etc. Co., 54
F. (2d) 933 (E.D. S.C. 1932); Hendersen v. Midwest Refining Co., 43 F. (2d)
23 (C.C.A. 10th, 1930).
728 U.S.C.A. § 72, note 56; 54 C.J. 307.8 In Beyer v. Soper Lumber Co., 76 Wis. 145, 44 N.W. 833 (1890), the Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that the time for removal was measured by the
time to answer the original complaint and not by the time to answer the
amended complaint, and therefore does squarely meet the problem presented
herein.
940 Fed. 545 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1889).
10 Decided by Judge Jenkins.
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but within each jurisdiction the procedure under the Removal Act
would be uniform. Unless removal were limited to this twenty-day
period prescribed by statute for answer, the right to removal which
"is not a floating right," would be "adrift upon the uncertain sea of
stipulation, demurrer, dilatory pleas and proceedings." As was said in
the Velie case: " . . . it is apparent that Congress intended that the
right should be exercised at the earliest period possible. That period
was designated to be at or before the time prescribed by law for
answering; not the time when the cause, by reason of dilatory proceed-
ings, might be ripe for an answer; not the time enlarged by stipulation
of the parties or by order of the court, but the determined time speci-
fied in the statute or in the rule of the court. The statute or the gen-
eral rule of the court speaks that time, not the order or the stipulation,
made in the particular case."1"
To properly evaluate the majority position, exemplified as it is by
the Velie case, the precise meaning of the phrase "the laws of the
state," supra, with respect to time to answer, as found in the Removal
Act, should be determined. The phrase "the laws of the state" is gen-
eral and inclusive. It negates any implication of limitation. The Re-
moval Act does not define "laws ;" nor does it circumscribe its applica-
bility. The natural meaning and clear implication of the phrase is that
it embraces each and every provision of law relating to time for
answer." Thus, all of the provisions of law or of a state must be
considered in determining the proper time for answer,-the proper
time for removal.
What are "the laws of the state" of Wisconsin with respect to time
for answer? An answer must be served within twenty days after serv-
ice of a copy of the complaint' A court may extend the time within
which any act or proceeding in an action must be taken and may do
so after the time has expired.'4 If the defendant does not answer
within twenty days, or within such further time as may have been
granted him, he is in default and judgment may be entered against
1 This decision was recently followed by the same court, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin, in an unreported case, upon a motion to
remand. Wisconsin Liquor Co. v. The American Distilling Co. (E.D. Wis.
1937). There, the petition and bond were filed in the state court within the
time extended by the state court for answer. In the same case, upon a prior
application to the state court for an order for removal, the Circuit Court of
Milwaukee County followed the Velie case and held that the application for
removal was not timely. See unreported decision, Wisconsin Liquor Co. vs.
American Distilling Co. (Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, 1937).
12 Citizens Trust & Savings Bank v. Hobbs, 253 Fed. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1918);
Hyden v. Southern Ry. Co., 167 N.C. 584, 83 S.E. 689, (1914).
u Section 263.05, Wis. STAT. (1935) : "The only pleading on the part of the de-
fendant is either a demurrer or an answer. It must be served within twenty
days after the service of a copy of the complaint."
-4 Section 269.45, Wis. STAT. (1935): "The court or a judge may, upon notice
and good cause shown by affidavit, and just terms, extend the time within
which any act or proceeding in an action or special proceeding must be taken(except the time for appeal), and may do so after the time had expired."
1937]
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him. 5 Finally, the parties, or their attorneys, may, during the course
of their litigation, bind one another by stipulation- s
When, "is the defendant required by the laws of the state (Wis-
consin) . .. to answer ... to the complaint ... of the plaintiff... ?"
When is a defendant in default for want of an answer? A defendant
must answer, or be in default, within twenty days after service of
the complaint, or within such additional time as may have been granted
him by a court or stipulation of the partiesa? So long as a defendant
may answer nothing in the Removal Act denies him the right of
removal.' s To hold to the contrary would be to ignore salient pro-
visions of the Wisconsin Statutes and to place upon the phrase "the
laws of the state" a construction that is strained, narrow and unwar-
rantedsa
While the United States Supreme Court has not passed upon the
instant problem, it has indicated that the limitations of time for removal
are merely modal and formal and not jurisdictional. True, diversity of
citizenship and other jurisdictional prerequisites are absolutely essen-
tial for removal and cannot be waived. The filing of a proper petition
and bond may be essential if insisted upon; but they may also be
waived, either expressly or by implication. They are procedural in
a Section 270.63, Wis. STAT. (1935): "Judgment may be had if the defendant
failed to answer to the complaint as follows: (1) In actions on contract. In
any action arising on contract for the recovery of money only the plaintiff
may file with the clerk, with the summons and complaint, proof of personal
service of the summons on one or more of the defendants and that no answer
or demurrer has been received . . .and that the time granted by any order
therefore has expired . . ."
16 Section 269.46 (2), Wis. STAT. (1935) : "No agreement, stipulation or consent,
between the parties or their attorneys, in respect to the proceedings in an
action or special proceedings, shall be binding unless made in court and entered
upon the minutes or made in writing and subscribed by the party to be bound
thereby, or his attoiney."
1, "These provision of the Code must be construed together, so as to give effect
to each phase therein. It is perfectly plain that the phrase . . . , 'Such further
time as shall have been granted' is a provision of the law of the State of
California, which provides for the time of the defendant to answer .... The
granting of extension of time .... may be done by stipulation of the attor-
neys. A stipulation made by the attorneys extending the time for answer
would, of course, be enforced by the court, . . .These provisions of the Code
are the requirements of the law of the State of California, which determine
the right of the defendant to answer." Citizens' Trust & Savings Bank v.
Hobbs, 253 Fed. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1918), following Tevis v. Palatine Ins. Co.,
149 Fed. 560 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1906), wherein the court upheld the timeliness of
removal proceedings undertaken during an extended period for answer. Both
cases considered the California Statutes relating to time to answer. These
statutes were similar to those in Wisconsin, cited in notes 13, 14, 15, 16, supra.
as "The statute (removal statute) refers to the time when the answer must be
filed. . . .The provisions are procedural, and the statute does not refer to
any particular period of time or number of days, but the actual filing of the
answer, and, if the petition for removal is filed, before, or at that time, it is
filed within the time required by the statute." Bankers Securities Corp. v.
Insurance Equities Corp., 85 F. (2d) 856 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1936).
Ssa "It seems to have been overlooked in passing upon cases for removal from
the state to the federal court, that our statute authorizes the ...court to
enlarge the time for filing pleadings ...The time is extended to the same
force and effect ...as if the extended period had originally been allowed
by the statute for filing the pleading." Hyden v. Southern Ry. Co., 167 N.C.
584, 83 S.E. 689, 690 (1914).
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nature.19 "The time of filing a petition of removal is not essential to
jurisdiction... "-20
The limitation of time for removal would seem to be, principally,
if not entirely, to secure the plaintiff against undue or unfair delays,
and therefore should not be considered mandatory in any sense that
would prevent the plaintiff from agreeing to a postponement of the
time for answer, or the correlative time for removal?' In New York,
with code practice provisions similar to those in Wisconsin, it has been
consistently held for many years that an extension of time to answer
likewise extends the time for removal 2
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion, that the majority
cases, and the Velie case in particular, overlook the provisions author-
izing enlargement of time for answer, though such provisions are
remedial in nature,2 and clearly part of "the law of the state." Assum-
ing that removal ought to be accomplished within the shortest possible
time, a time that is "fixed, stable, measured," Congress could have pro-
vided an absolute, rigid, and unalterable period for removal by pre-
scribing that a petition and bond be filed within a specified number of
days following the commencement of an action, and not thereafter.
However, Congress preferred not to limit removal in such manner.
19 "It does not belong to the essence of the thing; it is not in its nature a juris-
dictional matter, but merely a rule of limitation." Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S.
594, 5 Sup. Ct. 641, 28 L.ed. 1093 (1884). In Southern Pacific Co. v. Stewart,
245 U.S. 359, 38 Sup. Ct. 130, 62 L.ed. 345, (1917), the court said: "It is essen-
tial to the removal of a cause that the petition provided for by statute be
filed in the state court within the time fixed by statute unless the time has
been in some manner waived." See also Montgomery v. Sioux City Seed Co.,
71 F. (2d) 926 (C.C.A. 10th, 1934); Halsey v. Minn. etc. Co., 54 F. (2d)
933 (E.D. S.C. 1932); Henderson v. Midwest Refining Co., 43 F. (2d) 23(C.C.A. 10th, 1930). In Byron v. Barrizer, 251 Fed. 328 (W.D. Ky. 1918),
the defendant did not file his petition for removal within the proper time, yet
as plaintiff's counsel agreed, that the petition should be treated as filed,
although the time for answer had expired, any objection was waived.20 Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 18 Sup. Ct. 264, 42 L.ed.
673 (1898).
21 Muir v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 203 Pa. 338, 53 AtI. 158 (1902) ; Mapes
v. Shaub, 54 F. (2d) 419 (M.D. Pa. 1931).
22" . . . Since the requirements of the laws and court rules of New York make
liberal provisions for extensions of time to answer by order of the court or by
stipulation, it has been uniformly decided by the Federal Court in this state
for many years that an application for removal within the extended time is
compliance with Section 72 (28 U.S.C.A. § 7, Section 29, Title 28, Judicial
Code). "Silverstein v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 16 F. Supp. 315, (N.D.
N.Y. 1936).
In Rycroft v. Green, 49 Fed. 177 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1892), the court said: "It
is the law and practice of this circuit that an extension of time to answer by
order of the court, whether made on stipulation or not, extends the time for
removal. This was settled practice here before the decisions in other circuits
which are referred to in the argument, and, in view of what an 'extension of
time to answer' is under the code rules, and practice of the courts of this
state, seems conformable alike to the letter and the spirit of the Removal
Act."
See also Dancel v. Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co., 106 Fed. 551 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1900); Earle C. Anthony Inc., v. National Broadcasting Co. Inc., 8 F.
Supp 346 (S.D. N.Y. 1934); Samuel S. Glauber Inc. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
8 F. Supp. 347 (S.D. N.Y. 1934); Silverstein v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
16 F. Supp. 404 (N.D. N.Y. 1936).Brown v. Becker, 135 Or. 353, 295 Pac. 1113 (1931).
1937]
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It adopted a formula authorizing removal so long as a defendant could
answer, and it placed no limitations upon that time to answer.
In every case the time when a defendant answers, or the time
beyond which he is in default for want of an answer, is a definite and
fixed point in the proceedings. joinder of issue, or default for failure
to join issue, is as specific a phase of an action as is the commencement-
or the trial thereof. In every case, the joinder of issue, or the corre-
lative default for want of answer, is the same and identical stage in the
chronology or progress of the litigation, and this is true, although this
point is not reached within the same, or fixed period of time after the
commencement of the action. It is this stage of the proceedings that is
"fixed, stable, measured." The uniformity cherished by the majority
is present, though it is achieved on a sounder and more logical basis,
and in a manner more in harmony with the spirit and phraseology of
the Removal Act.
To summarize, so long as a defendant is not in default, that is,
so long as he may answer as a matter of right, removal proceedings
are timely.2 4 Now, quaere, is the time for removal extended by the
special appearance of a defendant? Assume, that after service of a
summons and complaint upon him, the defendant interposes a special
appearance challenging the court's jurisdiction over his person. Twenty
days for answer have passed and the court has not passed upon the
propriety or the validity of the special appearance. Has the time for
removal lapsed by reason of the passing of the initial twenty days for
answer? Does a special appearance ipso facto toll the running of time
for answer? When, after a special appearance is the defendant in
default ?2 If a special appearance tolls the running of time to answer,
does it likewise toll the time for removal? Upon these questions there
is an irreconcilable conflict of authority.26
"'Required' in the Removal Act has reference to the time when the defendant,
to avoid any default must necessarily answer or plead to the complaint. Until
that time comes, and at it, whether fixed by statute, by rule, or by agreement
between the parties, whether it is the time originally limited or that time
extended, the right to removal continues and can be exercised. Extending the
time to answer or plead, to defend, the principal thing extends the time for
removal, to chose the forum wherein to defend, an included incidental thing.
The time to plead is the measure of the time to remove-is the time to
remove. The federal law and the state law must be read together. The former
prescribes a limitation, the latter the extent of it. From the language of the
Removal Act, all this would seem a necessary conclusion. And it accomplishes
the object of the limitation, viz., that all the defendant's pleas may necessarily
be determined in the Federal Court .... It will be remembered the time for
removal is not jurisdictional, but is a rule of limitation, and like most limi-
tations, may be subject to waiver and estoppel, express or implied . .
Hansford v. Stone, etc., Co., 201 Fed. 185 (D.C. Mont. 1912).
25 "Properly speaking a judgment by default is one taken against a defendant,
who, having been duly summoned or cited in an action, fails to enter an
appearance . . . though the term is usually extended to include judgment of
nil dicit. The distinguishing feature of such judgment is that it follows upon
the negligence or omissions of the defendant, and the rule appears to be firmly
established that when an answer or other pleading of the defendant, raising an
issue of law or fact, is properly on file in the case, no judgment by default
can be entered against him, but that such answer or other pleading must be
disposed of by motion, demurrer, or in some other manner." Central Deep
Creek Orchard Co. v. C. C. Taft Co., 34 Idaho 458, 202 Pac. 1062 (1921).
-Heller v. Ilwaco Mill & Lumber Co., 178 Fed. 111 (C.C. Or. 1910); Hagen
v. New York Oil Co., 20 F. (2d) 944 (W.D. Wash. 1927); 54 C.J. 306.
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While an appearance is the act by which a party submits himself
to the jurisdiction of the court,27 a special appearance challenges the
jurisdiction of the court?8 Though the Wisconsin statutes do not pro-
vide for a special appearance, 9 the Wisconsin courts recognize and
approve it as the proper medium of raising a jurisdictional question.30
The problem is: If a defendant appears specially, may the court
authorize or engage in any proceedings other than a hearing and ruling
on the special appearance? Can a default judgment be entered against
such defendant for not filing his answer within the prescribed time,
when, obviously, by answering he would waive all objections to the
jurisdiction?
A special appearance is roughly analogous to a demurrer. A demur-
rer challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint; a special appear-
ance challenges the sufficiency of the court's jurisdiction over the
defendant. Both raise questions of law. To sustain either bars plaintiff's
right to proceed in that action. Since a judgment by default could not
be entered against a defendant whose demurrer to the complaint is
still to be passed upon, ought not a special appearance bar further
proceedings until the court has ruled upon the objections to jurisdic-
tion? In some states, the courts hold that any motion, the determina-
tion of which would affect the right of the plaintiff to proceed with
the action, prevents the entry of a default judgment.?1 The logic is
apparent; the entry of a special appearance should stay proceedings
until it has been determined. 2 If the special appearance is overruled,
the defendant should be permitted to answer. True, the Wisconsin
2 Dauphin v. Landrigan, 187 Wis. 633, 205 N.W. 557 (1925). The filing of a
petition and bond in the state court for removal to the federal court does not
constitute an appearance and does not waive any jurisdictional defect that
could be urged under a special appearance. State ex rel. Bergougnan Rubber
Corp. v. Gregory, 179 Wis. 98, 190 N.W. 918 (1922) ; Wabash Western R. Co.
v. Brow, 164 U.S. 271, 17 Sup. Ct. 126, 41 L.ed. 431 (1896); Goldey v.
Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 15 Sup. Ct. 559, 39 L.ed. 517 (1895). All juris-
dictional objections can be urged in the federal court after removal that
could be urged in the state court.
2 A litigant desiring to avail himself of the objections of want of jurisdiction
over his person must keep out of court for all other purposes. If he takes
any steps consistent with the idea that the court has jurisdiction of his per-
son, that will amount to a general appearance and will give the court juris-
diction for all purposes. Bestor v. Inter-County Fair, 135 Wis. 339, 115 N.W.
809 (1908) ; Milwaukee Elevator Co. v. Feuchtwanger, 141 Wis. 266, 124 N.W.
264 (1910).29The only references to appearance apply, it would seem, to general appear-
ances. See § 270.62, 256.27, 262.17, Wis. STAT. (1935).
sO Schwantz v. Morris, 219 Wis. 403, 263 N.W. 379 (1935) ; State ze rel. Nelson
v. Grimm, 219 Wis. 630, 263 N.W. 583 (1935); Gilbert-Arnold Land Co. v.
O'Hare, 93 Wis. 194, 67 N.W. 38 (1896).
Wisconsin has not passed upon this question. But see Robinson v. Earl Fruit
Co., 35 Idaho 254, 204 Pac. 534, (1922) ; Mihelick v. Butte Electric Ry Co., 85
Mont. 604, 281 Pac. 540 (1929); Smalley v. LaSalle, 26 S.D. 239, 128 N.W.
141 (1910); Blythe v. Hinckley, 84 Fed. 228 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897); Brauer
v. Paddock, 130 Fla. 1175, 139 So. 146 (1932).
Paramount Publix Corp. v. Boucher, 93 Mont. 340, 19 P. (2d) 223, (1933);
Cities Properties Co. v. Meachen, 33 Cal. App. 696, 166 Pac. 593 (1917);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hathaway, 49 Ga. App. 211, 174 S.E. 736 (1934); Rahr
v. Jeffrey, 128 Kan. 541, 278 Pac. 725 (1929); Rauch v. Zander, 134 Wash.
40, 234 Pac. 1039 (1925).
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courts have permitted a defendant in such position to answer,3 3 but
the distinction is between answering as a matter of right rather than
by exercise of a court's discretion.
It is elementary that a valid judgment by default cannot be rend-
ered without due proof of proper service upon the defendant, due
proof that the court has acquired jurisdiction over him.35 A special
appearance constitutes a warning to the court that there is a flaw in
the manner by which the plaintiff attempted to bring the defendant
within its jurisdiction. If the flaw is fatal to the proceedings any action
by the court would be invalid. Having been duly warned the court
ought to satisfy itself as to its jurisdiction, and it ought not proceed
until it has overcome the challenge to it. If the court proceeds without
a hearing and determination of the special appearance, how can it be
said that it has acted properly and within its jurisdiction?
Unless the courts of Wisconsin will hold that a stay of proceedings
results from a special appearance, it is futile to challenge the jurisdic-
tion of the court. If, after a special appearance, a defendant must
answer within twenty days in order to avoid being in default, he is
forced to submit himself to the court's jurisdiction, when actually he
challenged and objected to it. If he permits a default judgment to be
entered against him rather than answer or act in any other manner
inconsist with a special appearance, his property may be seized and
sold on execution, or he may suffer other irreparable damage. He
cannot help himself, he cannot prevent damage, unless he invokes
the assistance of the court and thus submits himself to the very juris-
diction he challenges.36 Suppose the defendant has thus been forced
to waive his objections, and he unsuccessfully seeks to vacate the
default judgment, the court having ruled that it may stand, then, the
defendant is in a dilemma,-there is a judgment against him and he
can no longer challenge the jurisdiction of the court. He has unwit-
tingly been placed in a helpless position. The special appearance which
was recognized as the proper method of challenging jurisdiction will
have become a mockery. To prevent this result, the special appearance
must be given its logical effect, namely, to stay or bar further proceed-
ings until it has either been sustained, in which case the action falls,
or it has been denied, after which the defendant may answer as a mat-
33See Upper Mississippi Trans. Co. v. Whittaker, 16 Wis. 220 (1862), where
the court recognized that trial courts, of their own motion, often extend the
time to answer, after a special appearance.
4 In some states by statute a special appearance stays the running of time for
answer and a defendant is permitted to answer after his special appearance
is overruled. State v. District Court, 80 Mont. 97, 257 Pac. 1014 (1927);
Kamp v. Bartlett, 164 Ill. App. 338 (1911) ; Cheraw Motor Sales Co. v. Sey-
mour, 130 S.C. 307, 126 S.E. 39 (1925). It is submitted that it is not necessary
to resort to statute to reach the conclusion contended for in the text, though
no doubt similar statutes in Wisconsin would clarify the situation.
3 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.ed. 565 (1877). "No judgment should be
entered on default without proof of the service of summons being on record."
Rockman v. Ackerman, 109 Wis. 639, 85 N.W. 491 (1901). See also Section
270.62 (WIs. STAT. 1935) requiring "Proof of personal service of the sum-
mons" before judgment by default may be entered.36 Farmington Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 216 Wis. 457, 257 N.W. 595
(1934); Beale v. Linquist, 92 Mont. 480, 15 P. (2d) 927 (1930); Duncan v.
Jones, 138 Okl. 91, 280 Pac. 436 (1929).
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ter of right. So long as a defendant may answer as a matter of right
nothing in the Removal Act denies him the right of removalY Thus,
in conclusion, the time for removal is subject to extension by stipula-
tion of the parties, order of the court, or special appearance of the
defendant.
37 See, contrary to the argument in the text, State ex rel. Neel v. Love, 110 Fla.
91, 148 So. 208 (1933), holding that a special appearance does not extend
the time for answer and therefore does not extend the time for removal;
also, Miller v. Troy Laundry Machine Co., 2 F. Supp. 182 (D. Okl. 1933)
holding that the time for filing a petition for removal is not tolled by the
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